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CASE NOTES
the past twenty-five years the courts havc observed, sanctioned, and even
encouraged the growth of an economy which tends to be national in
scope and the corresponding rise in the power of the national govern-
ment1 6 (at the expense of a resulting ero:;ion of state and local govern-
ment). It seems incongruous that these same courts would acquiesce
concurrently to an increase in the power of the states or to any additional
state barriers to commerce, even though the merchandise involved is
intoxicating liquor and the state is specifically given the power to regulate
such merchandise under section 2 of the i-wenty-first amendment. Thus,
it is reasonably safe to assume that any future decisions in this area will
continue to indicate that the steady trend of the past thirty years is one
which has become firmly ensconced in the minds of the arbiters of our law.
William Levin
16 KEL.LY & HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT,
749-89 (rev. ed. 1955).
CRIMINAL LAW-STATUTORY RAPE-REASONABLE
BELIEF OF AGE
The defendant and the prosecutrix, both unmarried, voluntarily en-
gaged in an act of sexual intercourse. The age of the prosecutrix was
17 years and 9 months. Subsequently, the defendant was charged with,
and convicted of, statutory rape pursuant to a California statute' which
provides that an act of .sexual intercourse with a female, not the wife of
the perpetrator, and under the age of 18, constitutes the offense of
statutory rape. On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the judgment
was reversed on the ground that the trial court erred in refusing to permit
the defendant to present evidence showing that he had reasonably
believed the prosecutrix to be 18 years of age. People v. Hernandez, 39
Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P. 2d 673 (1964).
In general, the court's reasoning was based on a California statute2
which states that, in the absence of a definite legislative intent to impose
absolute liability, the existence of a criminal intent is essential to the
imposition of criminal sanctions. More specifically, the Supreme Court
of California suggested three arguments in support of its decision: (1)
the gross injustices of decisions in the past: resulting from abandonment
of the mens rea requirement; (2) the fact that the defense of reasonable
mistake of fact is available in an action for bigamy, which is analagous to
I CAL. PEN. CODE § 261 (1). 2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 20.
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the crime of statutory rape; and (3) the necessity of criminal intent in the
offense of statutory rape, since it is not a regulatory offense.
In contrast to the decision in the Hernandez case it has been generally
recognized in most jurisdictions3 that a defendant's reasonable mistake
of fact as to the age of the female is not a defense to the crime of
statutory rape. The basic rationale of such a policy is the protection of
young women from committing unwise dispositions of their sexual con-
duct which will ultimately harm them. 4 Such protection, it is hoped, will
be accomplished by imposing criminal sanctions upon the male who is
assumed to be responsible for the commission of the sexual act.5 How-
ever, this often results in gross injustices to the male, as exemplified in
the case of Norton v. State,0 where a 19 year old male was imprisoned for
three years for committing an act of sexual intercourse with a consenting
15 year old female. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the defend-
ant male's mistake of fact as to the female's age was no defense. Clearly,
the penalty of a lengthy prison term and subsequent loss of reputation
are exceedingly harsh in view of the fact that the male believed his act
to be innocent.
In addition to the injustices resulting from imposing absolute liability
on the male, the past decisions have also been inconsistent with the
trend of decisions regarding the analogous crime of bigamy. Statutory
rape and bigamy are similar in that they both are sexual offenses, can
involve a reasonable mistake of fact, and may result in a severe penalty by
way of a conviction and loss of reputation.7 At common law, reasonable
mistake of fact was not a defense to bigamy, 8 but recently, there has
been a trend toward allowing such a defense.9 A particularly important
case in this regard is People v. Vogel,10 in which the defendant, who
reasonably believed his previous wife had obtained a divorce, was con-
victed of bigamy. On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the
3 People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896); People v. Lewellyn, 314 Ill. 106,
145 N.E. 289 (1924); People v. Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 130 N.Y.S. 524 (1911).
4 People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964).
5 State v. Duncan, 82 Mont 184-85, 266 Pac. 400, 405 (1928): "conviction depends
solely upon proof of intercourse and nonage, and if a man indulge in promiscuity
with strange women he has only himself to blame if it later develops that he has
unwittingly committed the crime of rape."
6237 Ark. 783, 376 S.W.2d 267 (1964).
7 People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
8 Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. 472 (1844); State v. Nichols, 241 N.C. 615, 86
S.E.2d 202 (1955); Manahan v. State, 188 Tenn. 394, 219 S.W.2d 900 (1949).
9 Reed v. State, 187 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944).
10 Supra note 7.
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conviction, ruling that one is not guilty of bigamy if he reasonably be-
lieves that he is eligible to remarry. The rationale behind this decision
was that, in view of the consequences of a conviction for bigamy, the
legislature must have intended reasonable mistake of fact to be a defense.
Subsequent to this decision, a number of states adopted this view and
many have enacted statutes which provide that reasonable mistake of
fact is a defense to the crime of bigamy." The change in Illinois 12 is in
accord with the fundamental principle of the Illinois Criminal Code:
the condemnation of conduct as criminal be limited when such behavior
is without fault.1" Pursuant to this policy' 4 Illinois has discarded the
felony of statutory rape and created the misdemeanor of "contributing
to the sexual delinquency of a child,"'15 for which mistake of fact is a
partial defense. The incorporation of the rationale of the Vogel case' 6
into the Hernandez case,' 7 provides future legislators with case support
for establishing reasonable mistake of fact: as a complete defense to the
crime of statutory rape.
Mistake of age has been recognized as an exception to the general rule
that reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a criminal offense requiring
mens rea. In spite of this fact, reasonable mistake of age as a defense is
well accepted where an infant's misrepresentation of age results in a
civil action. Notwithstanding some cases which have held to the contrary,"s
the great bulk of decisions in this type of c'ivil action have either estopped
an infant who fraudulently represented his age from disaffirming his con-
tract,19 or have permitted a tort action against the infant for deceit.20
1 1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-12 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.05 (1955); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 201.160 (1957).
12 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 11-12 (Comm. Comments) (Smith-Hurd 1961): "Punish-
ing him for making a reasonable mistake in remarriage would be attaching vicarious
felony liability contrary to the general principles of this code."
1 3 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-2(b) (1961).
14 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4 (Comm. Comments) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
15 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-5 (1961).
16 People v. Vogel, supra note 7'
17 Supra note 4, at 365, 393 P.2d at 677: "Equally applicable to the instant case are
the following remarks ...of the Vogel decision: 'The severe penalty imposed for
bigamy, [and] the serious loss of reputation conviction entails, [makes] it extremely
unlikely that the Legislature meant to include the morally innocent to make sure the
guilty did not escape.'
18 Sternlieb v. Normandie National Securities Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 188 N.E. 726
(1934); Raymond v. General Motorcycle Co., 23C Mass. 54, 119 N.E. 359 (1918).
19 Carney v. Southland Loan Co., 92 Ga. App. 159, 88 S.E.2d 805 (1955); Lewis v.
Van Cleve, 302 11. 413, 134 N.E. 804 (1922).
20 Byers v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 365 Mo. 341, 282 S.W.2d 512 (1955); Royal
Finance Co., v. Schaefer, 330 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
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Typical of these decisions is the case of La Rosa v. Nichols,21 wherein
a 20 year old youth contracted to' have his automobile repaired by the
defendant, representing that he was over 21. In an action for replevin
by the infant, the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey ruled for
the defendant and stated:
If a youth . . . by falsely representing himself to be an adult, which he
appears to be, for the purpose of inducing another, to enter into a contract
with him, and thereby, through such representation and appearance the other
party is led to believe that such infant is an adult, .. the minor will not
be permitted to set up the privilege of infancy .... 22
It is disturbing that in criminal actions, where the infant's misrepre-
sentation may result in a person's incarceration and loss of reputation,
it is thought that the infant must be protected; but under similar cir-
cumstances, in civil actions, the courts will not protect the infant when
such protection will result in a loss of money by the other party to the
suit.
One area of the criminal law in 'which misrepresentation of age and
reasonable mistake of fact will definitely not be allowed as a defense is
in the field of regulatory Offenses. The most common' regulatory of-
fenses concern themselves with the sale of intoxicating liquor to minors.23
One who sells intoxicating liquor to a minor is subject to criminal prose-
cution regardless of the miror's false representation of his age.24 These
regulatory statutes are enacted 'primarily for the purpose of protecting
the public health and welfare 25 and consequently, 'criminal sanctions are
relied upon without regard to the need for an element of intent. More-
over, these statutes normally entail a light penalty26 and seldom result
in damage to a person's reputation. Statutory rape, on the other hand,
does not meet the basic requirements of a regulatory offense, because a
violation of the statute is not necessarily a threat to the public safety,27
2192 N.J.L. 375, 105 Atl. 201 (1918).,
22 Id. at 380, 105 Atl. at 204.
23 See State v. Hartfield, 24 Wis. 60, 62 (1869): "The act in question is a police
regulation, and we have no doubt that the legislature intended to inflict the 'penalty,
irrespective of the knowledge or motives of the person who has violated its provisions."
24 People v. Werner, 174 N.Y. 132, 66 N.E. 667 (1903); State v. Schull, 66 S.D. 102,
279 N.W. 241 (1938).
25 The purpose of a statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor
is to protect the immature from the physical and psychological imbalance. caused by
alcohol, rather than to punish the offender. by
2 6 ILL., Rev. STAT. ch. 43, S 131 (1963), which provides for a fine of not more than
$100 or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 6 months, or both.
27 MODEL PENAL CODE, S 207.4, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, i955): "Pursuit of
females who appear to be over 16 betokens no abnormality but only a defiance of
religious and social conventions which appear to be fairly widely disregarded."
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the specific purpose of rape statutes is to proscribe the punishment for
the offender, not to protect the female; and the penalty for the violation
of such a statute is often a large fine anl lengthy imprisonment in the
penitentiary, 28 which results in loss of reputation. Since statutory rape is
not a regulatory offense, 29 a mens rea must be required. Consequently, a
reasonable mistake of age, inasmuch as it negates a criminal intent, should
be a defense as allowed by the Hernandez case. 0
, The above analysis has pointed out that past decisions have eliminated
the element of criminal intent resulting :in gross injustices, and that to
disallow the defense of mistake of age is inconstant with the present
trend in the law. The defense of mistake of fact has been created by
case law and statute in the analogous crire of bigamy. From all indica-
tions, it appears that the Hernandez case may be the beginning of a
similar trend for statutory rape.
Sandy Kahn
28PA. STAT. tit. 18, 5 4721 (1939), which provides a fine of not more than $7000, or
imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or botE.
29 See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLO. L. REV. 55 (1933).
30 People v. Hernandez, supra note 4.
EVIDENCE-TORTS-STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF
PHYSICIAN TESTIFYING AS AN EXPERT WITNESS
A nine year old child, who broke her arm while playing, was given
emergency treatment in a hospital operated by the defendants. After the
course of treatment was completed, the plaintiff brought this action con-
tending that due to improper medical attention her right arm had to be
amputated. Among other allegations, the plaintiff claimed that the physi-
cian who treated her improperly reduced the fracture in her arm, and was
subsequently negligent in not removing t ie cast despite severe pain and
swelling. In the trial court, Dr. Major, a practicing physician in San Fran-
cisco, California, was called as an expert medical witness on behalf of the
plaintiff, and was allowed to testify over the defendant's objections' Dr.
Major's testimony tended to prove the plaintiff's allegations of negligence.
' Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964), in reference to the witnesses' experi-
ence. Dr. Major was a graduate of Baylor University School of Medicine, and had
been engaged in the general practice of medicine for six and a half years in San
Francisco, California. Prior to that time he practiced with his two brothers in a
small Texas town where they operated a twenty bed hospital. Dr. Major had casted
between 120 and 150 fractures similar to the one in question and through his experi-
ence, reading, lectures and travels said that he was familiar with the practice in small
towns with regard to the treatment of fractures.
